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Drawing the Urinary Trait: 







Lacan discussed Ruth Lebovici’s case-study of Yves in his 1956-‘57 seminar on object-relations 
(Lacan, 1994), and again in one of two presentations at the Royaumont conference of July 1958, 
which would subsequently be published as “The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of 
Its Power” (Lacan, 1961). On both occasions, he expressed his appreciation for Lebovici’s clinical 
honesty, and showed how her continuous self-critical reflection upon the validity of her 
interpretations had testified to her rather cautious application of object-relations theory. 
However, whilst agreeing with her diagnosis of Yves’ condition as a phobia, Lacan also re-
interpreted her patient’s “transitory sexual perversion”, which revolved around the desire to 
observe women urinating, as the outcome of a series of technical faux-pas. In this chapter, I shall 
reconstruct Lacan’s argument, with particular emphasis on his proposition that the analyst’s 
interpretation of the transference triggers the acting out of the patient’s fantasy. The chapter 
may serve as a critical introduction to Lebovici’s case, and as a guide for re-reading it through the 
lens of Lacan’s own conception of psychoanalytic practice during the late 1950s, yet the reader 
will undoubtedly also benefit from comparing and contrasting my own commentary to other 
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discussions of the case (Berenguer, 2015; Bonnet, 2008: 52-62; Bruno, 2003: 50-53; Grose, 2017: 
13-15; Krajzman, 1986; McAleese, 2015). 
On twelve December 1956, during the fourth session of his seminar on object-relations, 
Lacan mentioned to his audience that a copy of the Bulletin d’activités de l’Association des 
Psychanalystes de Belgique had fallen into his hands, containing several papers by 
representatives of the French object-relations movement in psychoanalysis (Lacan, 1994, p. 64). 
At that time, French object-relations theorists found their main source of inspiration in the works 
of Maurice Bouvet (1967, 1968), and they attempted to formulate, much like Lacan himself, a 
solid alternative to the reigning doctrine of ego-psychology. Aversive to Anna Freud’s pedagogical 
outlook on psychoanalysis, yet equally critical of Melanie Klein’s “preformationist” conception of 
the drives and the Oedipus complex, the French object-relations group endeavoured to 
circumvent the controversy that had torn apart the British psychoanalytic community, by 
endorsing a nativist point of view without losing track of the possibilities for growth and 
development. Lacan hated it. He hated it so much that he devoted the first months of his 1956-
‘57 seminar entirely to an exposition of the fallacies, inconsistencies and stupidities pervading 
the movement’s key texts, such as the collectively edited volumes La psychanalyse d’aujourd’hui 
(Collectif, 1956). Lacan’s dismissal of French object-relations subsequently dominated a lengthy 
intervention on the direction of the psychoanalytic treatment at the Royaumont conference of 
July 1958. Here, his ruthless attack on the movement’s proposed programme of “emotional re-
education” and “genitalisation” made his former critique of ego-psychology seem rather gentle 
and kind (Lacan, 1961). 
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 When presenting the contents of the Bulletin d’activités de l’Association des 
Psychanalystes de Belgique, Lacan commended the fact that its contributors, although 
permeated by object-relations principles, had been more nuanced in their assumptions and less 
arrogantly self-confident about the value of their interpretations. This tentative and self-critical 
stance he especially highlighted in the case-study of a perversion emerging during the 
psychoanalytic treatment of a phobic patient by Ruth Lebovici (1956), which Lacan singled out 
both during his seminar and at the Royaumont conference as a worthy object of clinical 
investigation. As if trying to show that this paper deserved more attention than any of the 
chapters included in La psychanalyse d’aujourd’hui, whose authors he refused to mention by 
name because he believed that they had not actually made any significant, “properly scientific” 
contribution to psychoanalysis (Lacan, 1961, p. 537), Lacan included its author in the bibliography 
of his Royaumont presentation as ‘R.L.’ (Ibid., p. 540). 
 In this chapter, I wish to reconstruct the backbone of Lacan’s comments on Lebovici’s 
case-study as they appear in Seminar IV and, more succinctly, in the Royaumont text. Although 
the reader does not need to endorse Lacan’s remarks in order to make sense of Lebovici’s 
account, my chapter may nonetheless draw attention to some particularly thorny issues in Yves’ 
analysis, and it will hopefully also demonstrate how Lacan’s conception of psychoanalytic 
practice during the early 1950s differed from other approaches. 
 The first thing to note is that Lacan fully agreed with Lebovici’s diagnosis of Yves as a 
phobic patient, even though his “fear of being too tall” did not seem to revolve around an 
external object (Lacan, 1994, p. 88; Lacan, 1961, p. 510). Lebovici herself had realized this 
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complication when, in bringing her case-study to a close, she reflected upon the clinical-
diagnostic aspects of her patient’s condition: 
 
The obsessive worry for which Yves had consulted [the thought of being too tall and therefore 
laughable] seems indeed to enter the framework of the phobias, in particular because all anxiety 
is displaced onto the idea of height and because it is not annulled by a series of obsessional 
mechanisms. Nonetheless, in mainstream phobias, the anxiety is displaced onto an external 
phobogenic object (Lebovici, 1956, p. x). 
 
Yet whereas Lebovici simply registered (and accepted) the absence of the external object, Lacan 
pointed out that, although this object may not have been “exterior” in the traditional sense, it 
had been conspicuously present in a repetitive dream which Yves reported during the first year 
of his analysis (Lacan, 1994, pp. 88-89). In Lebovici’s case-study, this dream is presented as 
follows: “[A] man in armour attacks him [Yves] from behind with a kind of gasmask which brings 
to mind a fly spray and which would suffocate him” (Lebovici, 1956, p. x). For Lacan, the man in 
armour “is a perfectly recognizable phobic object, a splendidly illustrated substitute for a paternal 
image that is altogether lacking” (Lacan, 1994, p. 89). 
Lacan’s interpretation of Yves’ dream, here, does not only reflect his profound scepticism 
towards psychoanalytic frameworks in which exteriority is conflated with “the outside world”—
it is not because the object appears in a dream that is therefore less exterior—but also his 
budding theory on the nature and function of a phobia, which would come to full fruition during 
the Spring of 1957, in a sustained commentary of Freud’s case-study of Little Hans (Lacan, 1994, 
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pp. 199-435; Freud, 1909b). Lacan theorised the phobic object (or the phobic signifier, as he later 
designated it) as a symptomatic compensation for the failing Name-of-the-Father, which thus 
averts the overwhelming anxiety of the unmediated maternal presence. The development of the 
phobia paradoxically allows the subject to live a relatively anxiety-free life, because the anxiety 
resulting from the anticipated confrontation with the mother’s desire is bound to an object-
signifier which can be identified and avoided (Lacan, 2001, p. 259).  
 In Lebovici’s perspective, the “man in armour” did not feature as a phobic object nor, for 
that matter, as a substitute for the paternal image. Instead she interpreted “him” as an avatar of 
the phallic mother whom she believed to preside over the life of her patient. And indeed, Yves’ 
mother seemed to have exercised control over most of her son’s activities, even providing him 
with a mistress with a view to relieving his fear of being too tall. Yet Lebovici’s interpretation did 
not stop there, for she also used it as a template for gauging the position that she herself was 
being accorded within the transference: man in armour = phallic mother = analyst. Witness the 
following passage from Lebovici’s comments on the transference: 
 
[H]e talked about his fear of being mugged in the dark: the treatment gave him the impression 
that he was left in the dark and his associations prompted him to make explicit his fear of 
being attacked in the darkness from behind. We were able to remark that it was us that was 
precisely behind him. A couple of sessions later, he explained that he had the impression of 
suffocating during the session and he returned to his dream in which he had been sprinkled 
by the fly spray of the man in armour. He actually associated it with the sensations of 
suffocation he would have experienced when he came down with faux croup around the age 
 6 
of six. Our second intervention was situated there, according to which his fear of us reminded 
him of his fear of the man in armour. (Lebovici, 1956, p. x) 
 
This is probably the most explicit instance of the analyst’s forging a link between her 
patient’s dreams, the dominant image of the phallic mother, and her own position in the 
transference, yet it is by no means the only point at which Lebovici actively manoeuvred herself 
into a phallic position. At crucial moments, she tried to convince Yves that she was even more 
untouchable, more unshakeable, more phallic than his mother. For example, when during the 
third year of his analysis Yves asked his analyst to cancel a session, the analyst decided to 
interpret his passivity by telling him “that he would not obtain any satisfaction from us and that 
he would in this way be forced to come to the session as before” (Lebovici, 1956, p. x). The effect 
seems to have been that Yves started thinking that his analysis would only be over when he had 
finally succeeded in having sex with his analyst, to which the latter replied “that he was playing 
a game of making himself afraid of an event which he knew would never happen” (Ibid., p. x). 
During the fourth year of Yves’ analysis, Lebovici told her patient “that he feels the analyst to be 
more authoritarian than his mother, because the latter supported his regressive activities: jokes 
concerning anality, encouragement to go hunting” (Ibid., p. x). Lebovici was very much aware of 
how she was intermittently frustrating her patient (Ibid., p. x), and of how he experienced his 
mother as “infinitely more tolerant” than herself (Ibid., p. x), yet she pursued her strategy of 
transference handling with utter conviction, although she was not entirely sure of the validity of 
her own interpretations. Lacan (1994, p. 89; 1961, p. 510) drew attention to how Lebovici 
expressed an element of doubt after having interpreted the “man in armour” as the oneiric 
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representation of the analyst/phallic mother: “The question arises whether this interpretation 
was appropriate. . .” (Lebovici, 1956, p. x). 
Lebovici’s justification for her own doubt is quite remarkable here: 
 
[W]e had indeed explained to him some time before that he would have preferred being 
treated by our husband and one could suppose that he was encouraged to defend himself 
against the fear of a positive maternal transference by the outcome of material indicating a 
passive homosexual fear transferred onto our husband (Ibid., p. x). 
 
This comment only makes sense in light of the way in which Yves came to be Ruth Lebovici’s 
patient, and of how her husband’s clinical reputation cast a shadow over the analytic treatment. 
When, in the opening sentences of the paper, it is stated that “The twenty-three-year-old patient 
. . . was referred to Dr Lebovici by Dr Mignot’ (Ibid., p. x), “Dr Lebovici” should not be understood 
here as a self-referential term in the third person, but as a reference to Ruth Lebovici’s husband, 
Serge Lebovici, a renowned psychiatrist-psychoanalyst, personal adversary of Lacan, and the 
initiator of child psychiatry in France, who would become the first French president of the 
International Psychoanalytic Association, from 1973 to 1977 (Coblence, 1996; Saladin & 
Casanova, 2003). Hence, for reasons impossible to determine, Ruth Lebovici accepted Yves as a 
patient after he had been referred by her husband. Whether the young man was aware of the 
fact that his analyst’s husband, his “original” psychoanalyst, enjoyed a reputation far exceeding 
that of his analyst is not clear from the case-study, yet the analyst herself sporadically reminded 
her patient within the transference of her husband’s significance. When Yves reported a dream 
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in which he was not taking the train to Paris, where the consultations were taking place, but was 
going to Caen instead, where a good friend of his resided, the analyst told him that “seeing our 
husband would have been more pleasant and less dangerous” (Lebovici, 1956, p. x). 
Subsequently, she persisted in pointing out to Yves how he harboured a passive homosexual 
transference towards her husband, which would explain why he wanted to defend himself 
against a positive transference towards herself, i.e. why he wanted to sustain a negative 
transference relationship with his analyst.  
In his Royaumont paper Lacan suggested that in continuously referring to her husband, 
Lebovici inadvertently stitched the Oedipal situation back into the fabric of the analytic sessions, 
thus compensating for the patient’s “faltering Oedipus complex” with an “entirely forced” 
analytic Oedipality (Lacan, 1961, p. 510). And it is indeed extraordinary how, after Lebovici’s 
interpretation of his presumed defence against the positive transference, Yves started to 
integrate the image of her husband into his psychic landscape. During the fourth year of his 
analysis he imagined that Serge Lebovici had died (Lebovici, 1956, p. x). Around the same time, 
he revealed to his analyst that he was afraid of being caught in the act by her husband during one 
of the analytic sessions. The more he expressed his desire to sleep with his analyst, the more he 
became afraid of her spouse. He told his analyst that the only reason why her husband chose to 
see female patients was to cheat on her (Ibid., p. x). 
If Lebovici doubted the value of her interpretation of the “man in armour” as an image of 
the phallic mother, this doubt would thus have been instilled by her intimation that the 
appearance of the armed figure may also have been triggered by the patient’s repressed 
homosexual transference towards her husband. The interpretive doubt does not conceal an 
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insecurity as to the clinical value of interpreting the transference, but rather reflects a profound 
ambivalence as to the relative importance of the analyst and the analyst’s husband within the 
transference. The following passage bears witness to this ambivalence: 
 
Since he tried to perceive us as severe, demanding and prohibitive, we suggested to him—
concerning the fear of a man who might strangle him in the dark, and the repeated evocation 
of the man in armour associated with a feeling of being suffocated during the sessions—that 
he was scared of us just as he had been scared of the man in armour. This interpretation of 
the transference-situation merits discussion: we can indeed ask ourselves whether the 
material that alluded to a fear of being attacked by a man could be translated as a transference 
of the paternal type, as the flight into homosexuality mentioned above seemed to suggest, or 
rather concerned a maternal transference in which the fear of a phallic mother was relived 
(Ibid., p. x). 
 
It bears repeating here that up until then the patient had not mentioned the analyst’s husband 
in any of his associations; it is the analyst who introduces him into the sessions, after which the 
patient accords him the place of a rival in his thought processes. 
 Despite her doubt, Lebovici decided to pursue the “phallic mother” approach, a technical 
decision which, according to Lacan (1994, pp. 89-90), leads to the crystallisation and acting out 
of Yves’ “perverse fantasy”. Again, Lebovici herself is vaguely aware of her own contribution to 
the emergence of Yves’ “transitory perversion”. Charting Yves’ sexual history, she concedes:  
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During adulthood, his sexual life was definitely not satisfying. Nonetheless, we can indeed say 
that before the psychoanalytic treatment there was no such thing as a distinct perversion. 
Yves’ sexual life, as we were able to reconstruct it before the treatment, was much more that 
of a neurotic than that of a pervert . . . In our opinion, the voyeuristic perversion thus appeared 
during the course of the treatment itself, and it has developed within the framework of the 
transference neurosis. It is remarkable that this transference neurosis was essentially 
structured around the displacement of the maternal imago onto the analyst, yet it appears 
clearly enough that the patient did not talk about his perverse fantasies until his transference 
onto the analyst had been interpreted to him in terms of the displacement of the phallic 
mother onto her. (As an identification of the man in armour with the phallic woman analyst). 
(Lebovici, 1956, p. x). 
 
Although Lebovici offered all the elements here that could possibly lead her to consider her own 
implication in the patient’s “perversion”, she did not as such take responsibility for its emergence. 
Would it have been as “remarkable” for the patient’s transference neurosis to revolve around 
the analyst’s identification with the (phallic) maternal image, had Lebovici acknowledged that 
she herself suggested this link? Whilst she admitted that the interpretation of the patient’s 
transference seems to have elicited his perverse fantasies, she simultaneously failed to ascertain 
that her interpretation reveals less about the patient’s transference than about her own counter-
transference. 
 The merit of Lacan’s commentary on Lebovici’s case-study lies in his meticulous 
reconstruction of the relationship between the analyst’s technical faux-pas—her interpretation 
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of the transference as a blueprint of the patient’s position vis-à-vis the phallic mother, implying 
a reduction of his symbolico-imaginary sphere to the real of the analytic situation—and the 
analysand’s manifestation of an increasingly dramatic “perverse fantasy”, of seeing women 
urinating. The crystallisation and acting out of this fantasy follows a three-tiered process, 
whereby each of the transitions from one level to the next hinges around a specific analytic 
intervention (Lacan, 1994, pp. 89-92). 
 As Lebovici herself underscored, Yves did not start to recount dreams and fantasies 
involving urine until the second year of the treatment, after she had interpreted his dream of the 
“man in armour” as a representation of his fear towards the phallic mother. The first time Yves 
talked about his “urethral eroticism” he told his analyst how urinating women occupied his 
dreams, how his masturbatory fantasies were often supported by drawings of women who are 
urinating, and how he imagined being watched by a woman whilst masturbating in a urinal. 
Lebovici added that at the same time he also started to express a compulsion to urinate on the 
couch, and fantasized about urinating on the analyst’s faeces. In these fragments, we can observe 
a mixture of passive (being watched) and active positions (watching), yet for Lacan it was beyond 
doubt that the patient’s original fantasmatic scenario had placed the subject in a passive role, 
and that the actual transition from passive to active had already been triggered by the analyst’s 
interpretations. 
The first stage of the fantasy would thus entail the subject imagining being watched by a 
woman whilst he is urinating. This original passivity could also be justified on the basis of one of 
Yves’ childhood memories, in which he was being reprimanded by his mother for urinating on 
the floor (Lebovici, 1956, p. x). Likewise, the two dreams Yves brings to the sessions during the 
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first year (of the man in armour, and of him lying naked on the floor under a blanket whilst Yves 
Montand is standing naked in front of his mother), could be regarded as formations of the 
unconscious in which he is passive—being attacked from behind, being reduced to an object on 
the floor. For Lacan, the transformation of these scenarios to circumstances in which the subject 
plays an active part did not follow a natural, intrinsic course of development but constituted a 
reaction to the analyst’s interventions. In other words, if Yves reported dreams and fantasies in 
which he was actively observing women who are urinating, or in which he was urinating on the 
analyst’s couch, this would have been an outcome for which no one but the analyst herself had 
been responsible. 
Through her interpretations, the analyst had inadvertently controlled and thereby 
annihilated her patient’s desire, just like his mother had always done, and this analytic strategy 
had been fortified by her explicit wish to relate her patient’s materials back to the transference 
relationship, in which she had tried to convince him that he was perceiving her as a super-phallic 
mother. Confronted with his analyst’s attempt at neutralising his desire, Yves reacted with a more 
vehement, active expression of his fantasy. This is exemplified by a dream he reported at the end 
of his second year of analysis: 
 
[D]ream: he wants to ask the fishmonger, who is a family friend, to have sex with him, but he 
is stopped by the sight of her maid. In the course of his associations he will tell us that he had 
seen the fishmonger urinating . . . He tells us that he was in love with the maid in the dream, 
but that he was afraid of her husband. We were thus able to give him the following 
interpretation: it was less dangerous for him to watch, as he had done, this woman urinate 
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than to desire having sexual intercourse with a woman whose husband scared him (Ibid., p. 
x). 
 
In the dream, Yves appeared in a much more active position (he wanted to ask a woman to have 
sex with him), yet he was stopped in his activity by the intervention of a third party (the maid). 
His love for this third party had in itself been thwarted owing to the presence of a “second” third 
party (notably, the husband). In her interpretation, Lebovici endeavoured to “Oedipalise” and 
“re-genitalise” Yves’ sexual interest. In doing so, however, she was less concerned with producing 
an interpretation of  it, than with articulating a rationale for its preferable replacement with a 
more mature attitude. What Lebovici called an interpretation of Yves’ desire for passivity 
effectively comes down to its rejection as a non sequitur. 
 Consequently, and for Lacan this was the third stage in the crystallisation of the fantasy, 
Yves started to act out his “perversion” both within and outside the treatment. When during the 
third year Lebovici “interpreted” Yves’ first request to cancel a session as a futile desire for 
passivity, since “he knew very well that he would not obtain any satisfaction from us and that he 
would in this way be forced to come to the session as before” (Ibid., p. x), he eventually decided 
to tell his analyst that he would only be able to finish his analysis the day he had had sex with 
her. To which Lebovici responded categorically with a variation on what she had told him before: 
“[H]e was playing a game of making himself afraid of an event which he knew would never 
happen” (Ibid., p. x). At this point, the analyst again asked herself whether her intervention was 
justified, yet again this did not stop her from pursuing her path and confirming herself in her 
phallic position. And the more she allowed Yves’ fantasies to enter the transference, the more 
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he reacted to it by substantiating their value. During the fourth year, he expressed a desire to 
drink the analyst’s urine, he told her that he can smell her urine in the consultation room, he 
enjoyed spying on her legs, etc. Interestingly, Lebovici “interpreted” these occurrences as signs 
that the analysis was moving in the right direction. Although she discerned her own implication 
into their emergence, she did not regard them as indications of clinical failure, but as clear indices 
of therapeutic progress. Lacan was prepared to excuse Lebovici for entertaining this belief, which 
he attributed to her being misguided by the supervision she had received (from Maurice Bouvet): 
“[T]his analysis was, in supervision, given a direction that inclined her to constantly harass the 
patient to bring him back to the real situation” (Lacan, 1961, p. 510). Lacan accused Bouvet of 
orienting his supervisee towards the worst the object-relations movement had to offer (a 
reduction of the distance between the analyst and the analysand; genitalisation etc.), yet he at 
once applauded Lebovici’s recurrent self-reflexivity as an indication of her clinical insight. Her 
acumen would have prevented her from letting the analysis go astray, had she not been taught 
to recognize the analysand’s “sniffing” of the analyst as a firm sign of analytic progress. 
 Outside the treatment, Yves responded to his analyst’s interventions with the acting out 
of voyeuristic fantasies. Judging by Lebovici’s account, the acting out itself started off in a passive 
way and gradually incorporated more active elements. Initially, Yves masturbated in a cinema 
toilet fantasizing about how he was observing women who are urinating. After a while he 
discovered a cinema on the Champs-Elysées whose women’s toilets had a cubicle with a hole in 
the wall, so that he could really observe the woman on the other side urinating. When he told 
his analyst about his new hobby, she reacted with a statement whose analytic truth remains 
totally inconsequential: “[W]e pointed out to him that he found a compensation there for the 
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frustrations we imposed upon him” (Lebovici, 1956, p. x). Again, these developments do not 
bother Lebovici. On the contrary, she treated them as analytically productive phenomena. For 
her, Yves was actively reliving his “pre-genital” drives inside and outside the transference, in 
direct contact with the analyst, which would be a pre-requisite for their subsequent 
“genitalisation”. In accordance with Bouvet’s conception of the end of analysis—the realisation 
of a dual, genital object relationship through the fantasy of the incorporation of the phallus—
Lebovici even welcomed Yves’ desire to drink her urine, which for her symbolized the benign 
return of the extra-transferential acting out towards the transference relationship, and the start 
of a genitalised exchange of objects. 
 Of course, in Lacan’s reading of this case matters are completely different. Rather than 
seeing the crystallisation of Yves’ fantasy as an analytically productive development, he 
conceptualised it as a progressively worsening acting out, elicited and aggravated by the analyst’s 
“constantly intervening in a castrating manner” (Lacan, 1961, p. 510). It should be noted, here, 
that Lacan did not so much criticize Lebovici for preferring the phallic mother over the weak 
(invalidated) father. Rather, he criticized her for interpreting the transference as such, and 
thereby “killing” her patient’s desire, to which the latter could only react by showing it more 
forcefully. Through her interpretive actions Lebovici literally drew the urinary trait in and from 
her patient’s fantasy. 
The reader who studies Lebovici’s case and Lacan’s critique of it will quickly discover that 
his comments do not exhaust the richness of the paper. Lacan highlighted certain aspects to the 
detriment of others and his entire reading was conditioned by his own attempt at formulating a 
set of principles that could help the analyst direct the treatment. Here and there Lacan also 
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remained very allusive, so that it is difficult to measure the precise significance of his remarks. 
This is especially true for his notes on the way in which Yves’ treatment ended. Lebovici reported 
the events as follows:  
 
After the summer holidays, he insisted on his desire to end the treatment. He said that he had 
nothing to learn about himself anymore. We stopped at a mutually agreed date: about six 
weeks from then. He had been treated for varicose veins and he did not pay for the last 
session—with the money he went to see a prostitute. The treatment ended then (Lebovici, 
1956, p. x). 
 
This account is quite mysterious in its own right. How did Lebovici know that he used the money 
to see a prostitute? Did the patient tell her during the last session that he would be unable to pay 
her, because he had already spent his money somewhere else? Why didn’t she elaborate on this 
extraordinary decision? However, Lacan’s comments make things even more intriguing. In his 
Royaumont paper he posited that “the patient’s joke—probably not devoid of malice—about the 
fee for the last session being misappropriated to pay for debauchery is not a bad omen for the 
future” (Lacan, 1961, p. 511). I have pondered the meaning of this phrase numerous times over, 
yet I must admit that I am still not entirely sure how to situate it. 
 In any case, Lebovici’s paper has much more to offer than what Lacan extracts from it. 
Theoretically, it can stimulate further reflection on the relationship between phobia and 
fetishism. After all, we could be justified in the belief that Yves’ original phobia disappeared into 
the background as the analysis gets underway, and is being replaced, whether or not artificially, 
 17 
with a urine-fetish. In this context, Lebovici’s paper deserves to be compared with other cases 
addressing the relationship between phobia and fetishism, such as that by Tostain (1980). 
Clinically, it can reopen interesting questions on the incidence and vicissitudes of urethral 
eroticism, a vastly undertheorised realm in the field of psychoanalysis, despite imaginative 
contributions by Sadger (1910) and Freud himself (1932a). Given Lacan’s emphasis on Yves’ 
acting out of the fantasy as a response to the analyst’s interpretations, Lebovici’s paper may also 
be studied in conjunction with Ernst Kris’s famous case of the “man with the fresh brains” (Kris, 
1951), to which Lacan regularly returned as a paradigmatic text on the vicissitudes of an 
analytically induced acting out. 
Finally, I should mention that this case-study appears to be the only clinical publication 
by Ruth Lebovici. In 1958, she published a small piece on the role of the psychotherapist in a child 
welfare organisation in a professional journal (Lebovici, 1958), and much later she co-authored 
with her husband some remarks on the status of reality in psychoanalysis, as part of a conference 
discussion (Lebovici & Lebovici, 1971), yet these are the only other contributions by her that are 
in the public domain. The Bulletin in which her case-study was published stopped appearing in 
1959, when Fernand Lechat, one of its founding editors, passed away (Haber, 1992; Nobus & 
Libbrecht, 1997), yet after her 1956 paper Lebovici did not contribute anything else to the journal. 
Some additional biographical details on the person Lacan called ‘R.L.’ may nonetheless be of 
interest to the readers, if only because they may assist them when it comes to situating Lacan’s 
interest in the case within a broader historical perspective. Ruth Lebovici (née Roos) (1913-2003) 
originally trained as a maths teacher, but after her marriage to Serge Lebovici (1915-2000) in 
1942 she decided to train as a psychoanalyst (Missonnier, 2003). Lebovici did her training analysis 
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with Marc Schlumberger (1900-1977) (Roudinesco, 1986: 206), a respected member of the 
Sociéte Psychanalytique de Paris (SPP), which was the only psychoanalytic organisation in France 
at the time. During the first years of her clinical practice, she was supervised by Lacan (Miller, 
2013), which may explain why her case-study attracted his attention when he came across it. 
However, by the time the case-study was published, an acrimonious split had occurred within the 
French psychoanalytic movement, which had turned old allies into new enemies, and which had 
resulted in Lebovici choosing the side of her husband (Missonnier, 2003), against the newly 
formed Société française de Psychanalyse, where Lacan had rapidly established himself as the 
intellectual figurehead. As Lebovici indicated at the very beginning of her paper, the case of Yves 
had been supervised by Maurice Bouvet (1911-1960), one of Lacan’s adversaries in the SPP. As 
such, one could also read Lacan’s commentary on the case as a supra- or ex post facto 
supervision, with which Lacan intended to show how the treatment had been steered in the 
wrong direction by his opponent, and how some of its unexpected twists and turns could have 
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